Abstract First of all I will illustrate in this paper that some typical internal abductive processes are involved in chance discovery and production (for example through radical innovations). Nevertheless, especially concrete manipulations of the external world constitute a fundamental passage in chance discovery: by a process of manipulative abduction it is possible to build prostheses (epistemic mediators) for human minds, by interacting with external objects and representations in a constructive way. In this manner it is possible to create implicit knowledge through doing and to produce various opportunity to find, for example, anomalies and fruitful new risky perspectives. This kind of embodied and unexpressed knowledge holds a key role in the subsequent processes of scientific comprehension and discovery. The paper describes some of the "templates" of manipulative behavior which account for the most common cognitive and epistemic acting related to chance discovery and chance production.
Abduction in Theoretical and Manipulative Reasoning
Science is one of the most explicitly constructed, abstract, and creative forms of human knowledge. Today researchers concentrated on the concept of abduction pointed out by C.S. Peirce as a fundamental mechanism by which it is possible to account for the introduction of new explanatory hypotheses in science.
Abduction is the process of inferring certain facts and/or laws and hypotheses that render some sentences plausible, that explain or discover some (eventually new) phenomenon or observation; it is the process of reasoning in which explanatory hypotheses are formed and evaluated. There are two main epistemological meanings of the word abduction [1] : 1) abduction that only generates "plausible" hypotheses ("selective" or "creative") and 2) abduction considered as inference "to the best explanation", which also evaluates hypotheses. An illustration from the field of medical knowledge is represented by the discovery of a new disease and the manifestations it causes which can be considered as the result of a creative abductive inference. Therefore, "creative" abduction deals with the whole field of the growth of scientific knowledge. This is irrelevant in medical diagnosis where instead the task is to "select" from an encyclopedia of prestored diagnostic entities.
Theoretical abduction
1 certainly illustrates much of what is important in creative abductive reasoning, in humans and in computational programs, but fails to account for many cases of explanations occurring in science when the exploitation of environment is crucial. It fails to account for those cases in which there is a kind of "discovering through doing", cases in which new and still unexpressed information is codified by means of manipulations of some external objects (epistemic mediators). The concept of manipulative abduction 2 captures a large part of scientific thinking where the role of action is central, and where the features of this action are implicit and hard to be elicited: action can provide otherwise unavailable information that enables the agent to solve problems by starting and by performing a suitable abductive process of generation or selection of hypotheses.
Many attempts have been made to model abduction by developing some formal tools in order to illustrate its computational properties and the relationships with the different forms of deductive reasoning [3] . Some of the formal models of abductive reasoning are based on the theory of the epistemic state of an agent [4] , where the epistemic state of an individual is modeled as a consistent set of beliefs that can change by expansion and contraction (belief revision framework). These kinds of logical models are called sentential [1] .
They exclusively deal with selective abduction (diagnostic reasoning) 3 and relate to the idea of preserving consistency. Exclusively considering the sentential view of abduction does not enable us to say much about creative processes in science, and, therefore, about the nomological and most interesting creative aspects of abduction. It mainly refers to the selective (diagnostic) and merely explanatory aspects of reasoning and to the idea that abduction is mainly an inference to the best explanation [1] .
Scientific Change and Discovery Chance

The internal side of abductive reasoning
If we want to provide a suitable framework for analyzing the most interesting cases of conceptual changes in science we do not have to limit ourselves to the sentential view of theoretical abduction but we have to consider a broader inferential one: the model-based sides of creative abduction (cf. below). From Peirce's philosophical point of view, all thinking is in signs, and signs can be icons, indices or symbols. Moreover, all inference is a form of sign activity, where the word sign includes "feeling, image, conception, and other representation" [5, 5.283] , and, in Kantian words, all synthetic forms of cognition. That is, a considerable part of the thinking activity is model-based. Of course model-based reasoning acquires its peculiar creative relevance when embedded in abductive processes, so that we can individuate a model-based abduction.
Hence we must think in terms of model-based abduction (and not in terms of sentential abduction) to explain complex processes like scientific conceptual change. are Different varieties of model-based abductions [6] are related to high-level types of scientific conceptual change [7] . Following Nersessian [8] , the term "model-based reasoning" is used to indicate the construction and manipulation of various kinds of representations, not mainly sentential and/or formal, but mental and/or related to external mediators.
Finding inconsistencies by radical innovation
It is well-known that the derivation of inconsistencies contributes to the search for alternative, and possibly new, hypotheses [9, 10] .
Surely surprise and curiosity are related to the detection of inconsistencies [1, chapter 6] . Internal model-based abductive ways of generating a hypothesis that explains some phenomenon or conceptual problem that produced the question are heuristically linked to the activity itself both of finding that certain puzzling phenomenon or that particular conceptual problem or of eliciting that certain "hidden" phenomenon or conceptual problem. Hence, they are related to the activity of finding and producing chance. We will see (cf. section "Producing chance through manipulative abduction") that also from the perspective of a kind of reasoning we can call external (i.e. manipulative) typical templates of epistemic acting are still devoted to generate inconsistencies and curiosities as new trends to reach -abduce -new hypotheses.
In Against Method, Feyerabend [11] attributes a great importance to the role of contradiction. He establishes a "counterrule" which is the opposite of the neoposititivistic one that it is "experience", or "experimental results" which measures the success of our theories, a rule that constitutes an important part of all theories of corroboration and confirmation.
I have illustrated above that from the Peirce's philosophical point of view, all inference is a form of sign activity, where the word sign includes "feeling, image, conception, and other representation" [5, 5.283] . That is, a considerable part of the inference activity is model-based. Hence, many model-based ways of reasoning are performed in a manipulative way by using external tools and mediators (cf. the following section). Manipulative abduction [1] happens when we are thinking through doing and not only, in a pragmatic sense, about doing. So the idea of manipulative abduction goes beyond the well-known role of experiments as capable of forming new scientific laws by means of the results (the nature's answers to the investigator's question) they present, or of merely playing a predictive role (in confirmation and in falsification). Manipulative abduction refers to an extra-theoretical behavior that aims at creating communicable accounts of new experiences to integrate them into previously existing systems of experimental and linguistic (theoretical) practices. The existence of this kind of extratheoretical cognitive behavior is also testified by the many everyday situations in which humans are perfectly able to perform very efficacious (and habitual) tasks without the immediate possibility of realizing their conceptual explanation. x
In the following section manipulative abduction will be considered from the perspective of the relationship between unexpressed knowledge and external representations. The power of model-based reasoning and abduction (both theoretical and manipulative) mainly depends on their ability to extract and render explicit a certain amount of important information, unexpressed at the level of available data. They have a fundamental role in the process of transformation of knowledge from its tacit to its explicit forms, and in the subsequent elicitation and use of knowledge. It is in this process that chance discovery, promotion, and production is central. Let us describe how this happens in the case of "external" model-based processes.
Producing Chance through Manipulative Abduction
Chance and implicit knowledge
As pointed out by Polanyi in his epistemological investigation, a large part of knowledge is not explicit, but tacit: we know more than we can tell and we can know nothing without relying upon those things which we may not be able to tell [12] .
As Polanyi contends, human beings acquire and use knowledge by actively creating and organizing their own experience: tacit knowledge is the practical knowledge used to perform a task. The existence of this kind of not merely theoretical knowing behavior is also testified by the many everyday situations in which humans are perfectly able to perform very efficacious (and habitual) tasks without the immediate possibility of realizing their conceptual explanation: they are not "theoretically" aware of their capabilities. In some cases the conceptual account for doing these things was at one point present in memory, but now has deteriorated, and it is necessary to reproduce it, in other cases the account has to be constructed for the first time, like in creative experimental settings in science.
Hutchins [13] illustrates the case of a navigation instructor that performed an automatized task for three years involving a complicated set of plotting manipulations and procedures. The insight concerning the conceptual relationships between relative and geographic motion came to him suddenly "as lay in his bunk one night".
We can find a similar situation also in the process of scientific creativity. In the cognitive view of science, it has been too often underlined that conceptual change just involves a theoretical and "internal" replacement of the main concepts. But usually researchers forget that a large part of these processes are instead due to practical and "external" manipulations of some kind, prerequisite to the subsequent work of theoretical arrangement and knowledge creation. When these processes are creative we can speak of manipulative abduction (cf. above).
Scientists need a first "rough" and concrete experience of the world to develop their systems, as a cognitive-historical analysis of scientific change [14] and [15] has carefully shown.
Traditional examinations of how problem-solving heuristics create new representations in science have analyzed the frequent use of analogical reasoning, imagistic reasoning, and thought experiment from an internal point of view. However attention has not been focalized on those particular kinds of heuristics, that resort to the existence of extra-theoretical ways of thinking (thinking through doing, cf. [16] ). Indeed many cognitive processes are centered on external representations, as a means to create communicable accounts of new experiences ready to be integrated into previously existing systems of experimental and linguistic (theoretical) practices.
For example, in the simple case of the construction and examination of diagrams in elementary geometrical reasoning, specific experiments serve as states and the implied operators are the manipulations and observations that transform one state into another. The geometrical outcome depends upon practices and specific sensory-motor activities performed on a non-symbolic object, which acts as a dedicated external representational medium supporting the various operators at work. There is a kind of an epistemic negotiation between the sensory framework of the problem solver and the external reality of the diagram [2] . It is well-known that in the history of geometry many researchers used internal mental imagery and mental representations of diagrams, but also self-generated diagrams (external) to help their thinking.
This process involves an external representation consisting of written symbols and figures that for example are manipulated "by hand". The cognitive system is not merely the mind-brain of the person performing the geometrical task, but the system consisting of the whole body (cognition is embodied) of the person plus the external physical representation. In geometrical discovery the whole activity of cognition is located in the system consisting of a human together with diagrams.
An external representation can modify the kind of computation that a human agent uses to reason about a problem: the Roman numeration system eliminates, by means of the external signs, some of the hardest parts of the addition, whereas the Arabic system does the same in the case of the difficult computations in multiplication. The capacity for inner reasoning and thought results from the internalization of the originally external forms of representation [17] .
The external representations are not merely memory aids: they can give people access to knowledge and skills that are unavailable to internal representations, help researchers to easily identify aspects and to make further inferences, they constrain the range of possible cognitive outcomes in a way that some actions are allowed and others forbidden. They increase the chance discoverability. The mind is limited because of the restricted range of information processing, the limited power of working memory and attention, the limited speed of some learning and reasoning operations; on the other hand the environment is intricate, because of the huge amount of data, real time requirement, uncertainty factors.
The extra-theoretical dimension of chance discovery: templates of epistemic acting and epistemic mediators
I have introduced above the notion of tacit knowledge. Now I propose an extension of that concept. There is something more important beyond the tacit knowledge "internal" to the subject -considered by Polanyi as personal, embodied and context specific. We can also speak of a sort of tacit information "embodied" into the whole relationship between our mind-body system and suitable external representations. An information we can extract, explicitly develop, and transform in knowledge contents, to solve problems. Peirce gives an interesting example of model-based abduction related to sense activity: "A man can distinguish different textures of cloth by feeling: but not immediately, for he requires to move fingers over the cloth, which shows that he is obliged to compare sensations of one instant with those of another" [5, 5.221 ]. This surely suggests that abductive movements have also interesting extra-theoretical characters and that there is a role in abductive reasoning for various kinds of manipulations of external objects. All knowing is inferring and inferring is not instantaneous, it happens in a process that needs an activity of comparisons involving many kinds of models in a more or less considerable lapse of time. All these considerations suggest, then, that there exist a creative form of thinking through doing, fundamental as much as the theoretical one: manipulative abduction (see [1] and [2] ). As already said manipulative abduction happens when we are thinking through doing and not only, in a pragmatic sense, about doing.
Various templates of manipulative behavior exhibit some regularities. The activity of manipulating external things and representations is highly conjectural and not immediately explanatory: these templates are hypotheses of behavior (creative or already cognitively present in the scientist's mind-body system, and sometimes already applied) that abductively enable a kind of epistemic "doing". Hence, some templates of action and manipulation can be selected in the set of the ones available and pre-stored, others have to be created for the first time to perform the most interesting creative cognitive accomplishments of manipulative abduction.
Some common features of the tacit templates of manipulative abduction, that enable us to manipulate things and experiments in science are related to: 1. sensibility towards the aspects of the phenomenon which can be regarded as curious or anomalous; manipulations have to be able to introduce potential inconsistencies in the received knowledge and so to open new possible reasoning opportunities (Oersted's report of his well-known experiment about electromagnetism is devoted to describing some anomalous aspects that did not depend on any particular theory of the nature of electricity and magnetism); 2. preliminary sensibility towards the dynamical character of the phenomenon, and not to entities and their properties, common aim of manipulations is to practically reorder the dynamic sequence of events into a static spatial one that should promote a subsequent bird's-eye view (narrative or visual-diagrammatic), fruitful for further outcomes; 3. referral to experimental manipulations that exploit artificial apparatus to free new possible stable and repeatable sources of information about hidden knowledge and constraints (Davy set-up in term of an artifactual tower of needles showed that magnetization was related to orientation and does not require physical contact); 4. various contingent ways of epistemic acting: looking from different perspectives, checking the different information available, comparing subsequent events, choosing, discarding, imaging further manipulations, re-ordering and changing relationships in the world by implicitly evaluating the usefulness of a new order (for instance, to help memory).
Gooding [15] refers to this kind of concrete manipulative reasoning when he illustrates the role in science of the so-called "construals" that embody tacit inferences in procedures that are often apparatus and machine based. The embodiment is of course an expert manipulation of objects in a highly constrained experimental environment, and is directed by abductive movements that imply the strategic application of old and new templates of behavior mainly connected with extra-theoretical components, for instance emotional, esthetical, ethical, and economic.
The whole activity of manipulation is devoted to building various external epistemic mediators that function as an enormous new source of information and knowledge. Through epistemic mediators the mind is extended into the material word, so originating important cognitive scenarios. 4 Therefore, manipulative abduction represents a kind of redistribution of the epistemic and cognitive effort to manage objects and information that cannot be immediately represented or found internally (for example exploiting the resources of visual imagery).
From the point of view of everyday situations manipulative abductive reasoning and epistemic mediators exhibit very interesting features: 1. action elaborates a simplification of the reasoning task and a redistribution of effort across time [13] , when we need to manipulate concrete things in order to understand structures which are otherwise too abstract [19] , or when we are in presence of redundant and unmanageable information; 2. action can be useful in presence of incomplete or inconsistent information -not only from the "perceptual" point of view -or of a diminished capacity to act upon the world: it is used to get more data to restore coherence and to improve deficient knowledge; 3. action enables us to build external artifactual models of task mechanisms instead of the corresponding internal ones, that are adequate to adapt the environment to the agent's needs. 4. action as a control of sense data illustrates how we can change the position of our body (and/or of the external objects) and how to exploit various kinds of prostheses (Galileo's telescope, technological instruments and interfaces) to get various new kinds of stimulation: action provides some tactile and visual information (e.g., in surgery), otherwise unavailable. Also natural phenomena can play the role of external artifactual models: under Micronesians' manipulations of their images, the stars acquire a structure that "becomes one of the most important structured representational media of the Micronesian system" [13, p. 172] . The external artifactual models are endowed with functional properties as components of a memory system crossing the boundary between person and environment (for example they are able to transform the tasks involved in allowing simple manipulations that promote further visual inferences at the level of model-based abduction). The cognitive process is distributed between a person (or a group of people) and external representation(s), and so obviously embedded and situated in a society and in a historical culture. 
Chance extractors as ecological engineers
We can say abduction is a complex process that works through imagination: it suggests a new direction in reasoning by shaping new possible chances for explaining object and hypotheses (cf. the templates mentioned above). In this sense imagination should not be confused with an act of intuition. Peirce describes abduction as a dynamic modeling process that fluctuates between states of doubt and states of belief. To solve the doubt, and some eventually linked anomalies, the agent implements a process of information gathering which at the same time relates to the "problem", to the agent's evolving understanding of the situation and to its changing requirements. By imagination here I mean this process of knowledge gathering and shaping. A process, that Kant considered "blind", that leads to see things as we would not otherwise have seen them: "a blind but indispensable function of the soul, without which we should not have no knowledge whatsoever" [21, A78-B103, p.112]. Scientific creativity, it is pretty obvious, involves seeing the world in a particular new way: scientific understanding permits us to see some aspects of reality in a particular way and creativity relates to this capacity to shed new light. Suggestions which make us able to further analyze this process come from a theory developed in the area of computer vision: the active perception approach (cf. [22] ), related to the tradition of the so-called "ecological" realism proposed by Gibson [23] .
This approach aims at understanding cognitive systems in terms of their environmental situatedness: instead of being used to build a comprehensive inner model of its surroundings, the agent's perceptual capacities are seen as simply used to obtain "whatever" specific pieces of information are necessary for its behavior in the world. The agent constantly "adjusts" its vantage point, updating and refining its procedures, in order to uncover a piece of information. This resorts to the need of specifying how to efficiently examine and explore and to the need of "interpreting" an object of a certain type. It is a process of attentive and controlled perceptual exploration through which the agent is able to collect the necessary information: a purposefully moving through what is being examined, actively picking up information rather than passively transducing (cf. [23] ). In this sense, humans like other creatures are ecological engineers [24] , because they do not simply live their environment, but they actively shape and change it looking for suitable chances, epistemic for example, like in our case of scientific abductive thinking.
As suggested for instance by Lederman and Klatzky [25] , this view of perception may be applied to all sense modes: for example, it can be easily extended to the haptic mode. Mere passive touch, in fact, tells us little, but by actively exploring an object with our hands we can find out a great deal. Our hands incorporate not only sensory transducers, but musculature which, under central control, moves them in appropriate ways: lifting something tells about its weight, running fingers around the contours provides shape information, rubbing it reveals texture. As already stressed by Peirce in the quotation I already reported above, when dealing with the hypothesizing activity of what I call manipulative abduction, a man can distinguish different textures of cloth by feeling [5, 5 .221].
Thomas [22] suggests we can think of the fingers together with the neural structures that control, for example, running them so that we can consider the afferent signals that they generate as a sort of (perceptual) instrument to gather knowledge: a complex of physiological structures capable of active testing for some environmental property. The study of manipulative abduction that I outlined above, can gain from this approach.
To give an example, the role of particular epistemic mediators (optical diagrams) in non-standard analysis has been studied, and so their function in grasping and teaching abstract and difficult mathematical concepts (see [26] ). In this case the external models (mathematical diagrams) do not give full available knowledge, but, on the contrary, compel the agent to engage a continuous epistemic dialogue between the diagrams and its internal knowledge to the aim of understanding an already existing information or at "creating" a new one.
It is clear that humans and other animals make a great use of perceptual reasoning and kinesthetic abilities. We can catch a thrown ball, cross a busy street, read a musical score, go through a passage by imaging if we can contort out bodies to the way required, evaluate shape by touch, recognize that an obscurely seen face belongs to a friend of ours, etc. Usually the "computations" required to achieve these tasks are not accessible to a conscious description and provide a wide range of new chances opportunities. Mathematical reasoning uses language explanations, but also non-linguistic notational devices and models. Geometrical constructions represent a relatively simple example of this kind of extra-linguistic machinery we know as characterized in a model-based and manipulative -abductive -way.
Conclusion
It is clear that the abductive manipulation of external objects helps human beings in chance discovery and production and thus in their creative tasks. I have illustrated the strategic role played by the so-called traditional concept of "implicit knowledge" in terms of the recent cognitive and epistemological concept of manipulative abduction, considered as a particular kind of abduction that exploits external models endowed with delegated cognitive roles and attributes.
